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The National Security Strategy of 2002 suggests that the 
United States has determined that when faced with the 
threat of attacks from actors in possession of weapons of 
mass destruction, a strategy of deterrence is not 
appropriate.  The prospect of absorbing another attack on 
the caliber of the attacks of September 11, 2001 is 
unacceptable.  As a result, the United States must either 
abandon the strategy of deterrence for most security 
challenges or it must adopt a new concept of deterrence.  
This thesis suggests that the practice of a new concept of 
deterrence, in which the United States threatens punishment 
to an adversary for actions short of military attacks 
against the United States, would address security 
challenges across the spectrum of threats.  Under this 
concept, preemptive attacks and preventive war constitute 
possible examples of deterrence failures.  This thesis 
outlines the parameters of the new deterrence situation, 
the requirements for success in pursuing this strategy, and 
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America of September 17, 2002 (NSS) received much attention 
when it was published a year after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001.  The George W. Bush administration was 
faced with the challenges of confronting significant 
security threats from so-called rogue states and non-state 
actors, potentially employing terrorist tactics and weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) against U.S. interests around the 
world and possibly directly against the U.S. homeland.  
While these threats were not new, the attacks of   
September 11 exposed a vulnerability of the United States 
that was recognized in principle prior to the attacks but 
believed to be somehow “out of bounds” for the foes of the 
United States.  The realization that the U.S. homeland 
could be attacked, almost at will, by forces which could 
produce mass casualties caused the Bush administration to 
adjust its strategic security outlook such that the United 
States could reduce the likelihood of sustaining additional 
attacks similar to those of September 11. 
 The traditional notion of deterrence, as practiced by 
the United States during the decades following World     
War II, was considered to be perhaps out of date and 
inappropriate for confronting the types of security threats 
facing the United States in the 21st century.  The Bush 
administration believed that while deterrence might be an 
appropriate strategy in some contemporary cases, the 
gravest threats facing the United States could not be 
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adequately addressed through a strategy of deterrence.1  The 
characteristics of non-state actors made them problematic 
targets for deterrence, which was traditionally applied 
toward unitary state actors.  States that were willing to 
use and share WMD likewise seemed poor candidates for a 
strategy of deterrence because the Bush administration was 
unwilling to sustain additional attacks of the caliber of 
the attacks of September 11; although traditional 
deterrence situations called for (perhaps massive) 
punishment in retaliation for an attack on the United 
States, the prospect of WMD attacks on the United States 
were considered totally unacceptable, even if the 
responsible party would be completely defeated in 
retaliation.  As explained by President Bush, 
For much of the last century, America's defense 
relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence 
and containment.  In some cases, those strategies 
still apply.  But new threats also require new 
thinking.  Deterrence -- the promise of massive 
retaliation against nations -- means nothing 
against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation 
or citizens to defend.  Containment is not 
possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons 
of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on 
missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist 
allies.2  
For these reasons, the NSS does not accord deterrence the 
primary role in U.S. security strategy. 
 The NSS reveals the Bush administration’s bias for 
action against the potential foes of the United States.  
                         
1
 President of the United States, “The National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America,” September 17, 2002: Preface; The White 
House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President at 2002 
Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy, West Point, 
New York, June 1, 2001 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/ 
06/20020601-3.html> Accessed November 18, 2003. 
2
 The White House, Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise 
of the United States Military Academy. 
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The elements of the NSS which received the most attention 
from observers were those which indicated that the United 
States would act preemptively and unilaterally, if 
necessary, to defeat threats to U.S. interests.  The 
National Security Advisor, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, commented 
on the role of preemption, as opposed to deterrence and 
containment: 
[Containment or deterrence] can and will continue 
to be employed where appropriate.  But some 
threats are so potentially catastrophic -- and 
can arrive with so little warning, by means that 
are untraceable -- that they cannot be 
contained…And new technology requires new 
thinking about when a threat actually becomes 
“imminent.”  So as a matter of common sense, the 
United States must be prepared to take action, 
when necessary, before threats have fully 
materialized…The number of cases in which [this 
approach] might be justified will always be 
small.  It does not give a green light -- to the 
United States or any other nation -- to act first 
without exhausting other means, including 
diplomacy.  Preemptive action does not come at 
the beginning of a long chain of effort.  The 
threat must be very grave.  And the risks of 
waiting must far outweigh the risks of action.3  
 This thesis examines the role of deterrence within the 
framework of the NSS.  Through a review of the Bush 
administration’s strategic approach, the nature of threats 
in the current security environment, a survey of deterrence 
theory literature, and a contemporary example of a security 
challenge, this thesis concludes that the United States 
might be well-served by employing a new concept of 
deterrence for a variety of security challenges, including 
                         
3
 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Dr. Condoleezza Rice 
Discusses President's National Security Strategy,” Waldorf Astoria 
Hotel, New York, NY, October 1, 2002 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ 
releases/2002/10/20021001-6.html> Accessed November 18, 2003. 
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cases of WMD threats from rogue states.  Rather than 
reserving the strategy of deterrence for a few cases that 
might resemble the Cold War standoff between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, a new concept of deterrence 
might be applied across the spectrum of security 
challenges.  This new concept of deterrence provides that 
the United States threaten action, including military 
action, to a foe in response to activity that the United 
States deems hostile or undesirable but is activity short 
of an actual attack against the United States or U.S. 
interests.  Within this framework, the concepts of 
preemption and preventive war should be considered the 
threatened punishments to U.S. foes, delivered in cases of 
deterrence failures, rather than as fundamental departures 
from previous U.S. national security strategies. 
 Chapter II presents a brief interpretation of elements 
of the NSS and the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) 
that suggests that deterrence should still be very much a 
part of U.S. national security strategy.  It is argued that 
the concepts of preemption and preventive war, as parts of 
the NSS, are encompassed by a new, broadened concept of 
deterrence and do not represent a fundamental departure 
from previous national security strategies. 
 Chapter III provides a presentation of several 
academic interpretations of deterrence.  Commentary on the 
strengths and weaknesses of several deterrence theories 
leads to a suggestion regarding the best way to capture the 
new interpretation of deterrence within a conceptual 
framework that can be employed by U.S. policymakers.  
Finally, the concept of compellence is briefly addressed, 
as it is intimately related to the practice of a national 
strategy of deterrence. 
  
 
 5  
 Chapter IV scrutinizes the concept of deterrence 
developed in Chapters II and III.  A series of potential 
pitfalls for the employment of deterrence is presented with 
recommendations for policymakers on the best way to proceed 
with a strategy of deterrence within the current security 
environment. 
 A case study is presented in Chapter V.  The period 
between September 11, 2001 and March 20, 2003 is framed as 
a deterrence situation, concluding in a deterrence failure, 
in which the United States confronted Iraq’s possession of 
WMD.  The case study illustrates the manner in which 
deterrence can be employed, even against rogue states with 
WMD, and it shows the challenges that confront the United 
States in trying to employ a strategy of deterrence in the 
future. 
 Chapter VI concludes with lessons learned since 
September 11, 2001 and demonstrates the complexities and 
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CHAPTER II. DETERRENCE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY 
 
A.  DETERRENCE AND THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
 Since the Bush administration did not produce a 
National Security Strategy document during its first year 
in office, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s QDR of 
September 30, 2001 serves as the first formal presentation 
of the administration’s evaluation of the post-September 11 
global security environment, of the objectives of the 
United States within that environment, and of the means by 
which the United States intends to address its security 
challenges.  The QDR identifies four defense policy goals 
“to defend the nation and secure a viable peace.”4  One of 
the policy goals is specifically deterrence of threats to 
national interests, but each of the four goals is related 
to a national strategy of deterrence.  Interestingly, the 
NSS appears to value deterrence as only one among several 
tactics or as a favorable condition that might emerge as a 
byproduct of other U.S. actions, but it does not embrace 
deterrence as a national strategy.  However, an 
interpretation of the document’s intentions is that the NSS 
seeks to divorce the concept of deterrence from the mindset 
of mutual assured destruction (MAD), popularized during the 
Cold War, in favor of a new approach to deterrence that 
enables the strategy to address a variety of threats from a 
variety of actors; deterrence, outside the framework of 
MAD, is still a national strategy. 
 The reaction of John Lewis Gaddis is representative of 
the attitudes of myriad commentators on the NSS: “President 
                         
4
 U.S. Secretary of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” 
September 30, 2001: 11. 
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George W. Bush’s national security strategy could represent 
the most sweeping shift in U.S. grand strategy since the 
beginning of the Cold War.”5  The ideas within the NSS that 
spark this type of reaction generally relate to the 
document’s bias for action when U.S. interests are 
threatened.  The NSS advocates defeating or diffusing 
threats through the use of force preemptively, unilaterally 
if necessary, beyond U.S. borders, before threats are fully 
developed, particularly in facing the challenges of WMD and 
terrorism.6  Examples of this new method of guaranteeing 
U.S. security can be seen in the current military 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the 2002 attack 
on al Qaeda leaders via unmanned aerial vehicle in Yemen.  
In addition to the general statements of U.S. interests and 
intentions found in the NSS, President Bush has also 
repeatedly issued general warnings in speeches to an 
unspecified global audience that the United States will not 
tolerate certain types of behavior, among which are state 
support for terrorism, state harboring of terrorists, and 
acquisition or proliferation of WMD.  Also, in the Middle 
East, more specific warnings, regarding interference in 
Iraq’s internal affairs and support for terrorist 
                                                                         
 
5
 John Lewis Gaddis, “A Grand Strategy of Transformation,” Foreign 
Policy 133 (November/December 2002): 50. 
6
 NSS, 5-7, 13-16.  The term, preemption, suggests action designed to 
thwart an imminent enemy attack.  I believe the Bush administration 
conceives of the concept of preemption in terms more similar to the 
concept of preventive war, in which action is taken against a foe that 
poses a threat through the possession of capabilities and/or hostile 
intentions yet is not about to attack.  In the contemporary security 
environment, a rogue state’s possession of WMD might provoke a U.S. 
attack, even though there is little or no evidence that the rogue state 
was planning an attack on the United States.  This example might be 
categorized as a case of preventive war, but I believe the Bush 
administration might categorize the case as preemption.  While 
acknowledging ambiguity in the definition of preemption, I have 
attempted to not use the term interchangeably with preventive war. 
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organizations, have recently been administered to Syria and 
Iran with promises of grave consequences for failure to 
comply. 
 The general statements of intent found in the NSS and 
uttered by President Bush and the recent U.S. military 
activity are setting the stage for the practice of the new 
concept of deterrence identified vaguely in the NSS and 
QDR.  This current concept of deterrence is not a 
fundamental departure from existing theories of deterrence, 
but it tends to require a broader definition.  A study of 
deterrence theories vis á vis an evaluation of current U.S. 
policy might help to better direct U.S. political and 
military efforts to accomplish national goals and to 
protect national interests through a minimal application of 
force. 
B.  PARAMETERS FOR A NEW U.S. CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE 
 The NSS expresses the Bush administration’s doubt that 
traditional concepts of deterrence will be an effective 
means of addressing the current security environment in 
which the greatest immediate threats to U.S. interests lie 
in unconventional, asymmetric attacks by terrorist enemies 
and rogue states, especially when these enemies wield WMD.  
The fault in traditional concepts of deterrence that is 
identified in the NSS is the ineffectiveness of the 
reactive posture of retaliation in response to attacks on 
U.S. interests.  The Bush administration’s evaluation of 
the “terrorist enemy” and the leaders of rogue states is 
that their apparent willingness to die, to take great 
risks, and to gamble with the lives of their people and the 
wealth of their nations makes these adversaries less 
probable to succumb to any U.S. threats of retaliation.  
The possibility that a WMD attack by these adversaries 
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would result in massive civilian casualties causes the Bush 
administration to search for a new concept of deterrence 
that promises the prevention of an attack with greater 
certainty; the consequences of a traditional deterrence 
failure, in which an attack is sustained by the United 
States before it responds, are unacceptable to the Bush 
administration, considering the deadliness of WMD and in 
light of the terrorist attacks of September 11.7 
 1.  Deterrence by Punishment 
 The NSS states the willingness of the United States to 
act preemptively, “[to take] anticipatory action to defend 
ourselves.”8  The United States “[recognizes] that our best 
defense is a good offense.”9  While the concept of 
preemption may be considered a radical departure from 
previous U.S. security strategies, preemption is actually 
related to deterrence by punishment, a concept whereby some 
type of harm is promised an opponent that fails to comply 
with U.S. demands;10 the United States is offering a threat 
of military and/or other action to any state or 
organization (but specifically to rogue states and 
terrorist organizations) which contemplates, plans, seeks 
to acquire the means, or acquires the means of attacking 
the United States or its interests, particularly with WMD.  
The conditions under which the United States will deliver 
punishment fall short of an actual attack on the United 
States or its interests, constituting a deviation from most 
                         
7
 Ibid, 14-15. 
8
 Ibid, 15. 
9
 Ibid, 6. 
10
 David E. Johnson, Karl P. Mueller and William H. Taft, V, 
Conventional Coercion across the Spectrum of Operations: The Utility of 
U.S. Military Forces in the Emerging Security Environment (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 2002), 16. 
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theories of deterrence, which provide for punishment only 
in the case of an actual attack. 
 The QDR addresses the means by which preemption, or 
the new concept of deterrence by punishment, may be viewed 
as a credible capability.  Within the defense policy goal 
of “deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests,” 
the QDR states an intent to “provide the President with a 
wider range of military options,” specifically including 
enhanced capabilities in forward deployed forces and 
improved intelligence capabilities.11  The goal to “deter 
forward” will allow intelligence assets to provide U.S. 
forces, but more importantly the National Command 
Authorities (NCA), with “critical information on 
adversaries’ intentions, plans, strengths, and 
weaknesses.”12  The forward deployed forces will provide a 
capability to strike rapidly, flexibly and accurately, 
giving the NCA a variety of retaliatory options across the 
spectrum of violence and destruction, should deterrence 
fail.  This ability to decisively defeat any adversary 
constitutes a second defense policy goal.13  Additionally, 
the goal to deter forward includes security cooperation 
with allies and friends (which is a critical part of a 
third defense policy goal of “assuring allies and 
friends”14) in order to enhance military and intelligence 
capabilities in the face of a threat;15 security cooperation 
and efforts to enhance collective security measures can 
serve to add weight to deterrent threats that might 
                         
11




 Ibid, 13. 
14
 Ibid, 11. 
15
 Ibid, 20. 
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otherwise include only unilateral action.16  
“Operationalizing” the concept of deter forward allows the 
United States to determine when it might be threatened, to 
surmise the intentions of its foe, to assess the best way 
to threaten the foe, to determine the best way to 
communicate the threat, to provide a capable and credible 
threat, and to punish the foe should deterrence fail. 
 2.  Deterrence by Denial 
 The NSS identifies other elements of U.S. strategy 
that can be interpreted as deterrence by denial, a concept 
whereby the United States seeks to convince its opponent 
that attempts to attack U.S. interests will be 
unsuccessful.17  U.S. deterrence by denial works in 
conjunction with deterrence by punishment.  Although there 
is little doubt that the Bush administration views the 
prospect of another successful attack on the magnitude of 
the attacks of September 11 as unacceptable, there seems to 
be an acknowledgement that no effort at defense or 
deterrence by punishment can be expected to stave off all 
attacks.  The U.S. strategy of deterrence by denial works 
to show potential adversaries that no attack launched on 
the United States or its interests will succeed in 
defeating the country to any degree.  Maintaining the most 
powerful armed forces in the world is a means of deterring 
conventional attacks by denial.  The NSS states that no 
adversaries seek to attack the United States using 
conventional means; “they know such attacks would fail.”18  
Similarly, the United States attempts deterrence by denial 
                         
16
 Michael P. C. Carns, “Reopening the Deterrence Debate: Thinking about 
a Peaceful and Prosperous Tomorrow,” in Max G. Manwaring, ed., 
Deterrence in the 21st Century (Portland: Frank Cass, 2001), 9. 
17
 Johnson, Mueller and Taft, 16-17. 
18
 NSS, 15. 
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by tasking its armed forces to be able to identify and 
destroy threats before they reach U.S. borders;19 
establishing the capability to stop an attack before it 
reaches its target serves to deter the attack in the first 
place.  Not only does the United States seek to maintain a 
powerful military as a means of deterrence by denial and as 
a tool of compellence and deterrence by punishment, but a 
fourth defense policy goal is to ensure that the United 
States remains dominant globally and free from any future 
military competition, aiding in deterrence over the very 
long term.20  In another instance of deterrence by denial, 
the NSS states, “we are also strengthening America’s 
homeland security to protect against and deter attack.”21  
Specifically, consequence management to respond to the 
effects of a WMD attack serves as deterrence by denial: 
“Minimizing the effects of WMD use against our people will 
help deter those who possess such weapons and dissuade 
those who seek to acquire them by persuading enemies that 
they cannot attain their desired ends.”22  The proposition 
of Paul Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins regarding an 
aversion of terrorists for operational risk might also be 
applied to state actors: “they may be willing to risk or 
give their lives, but not in futile attacks.”23  U.S. 
deterrence by denial seeks to maximize the perception of 
futility of potential attacks on the United States and its 
interests. 
 
                         
19
 Ibid, 6. 
20
 QDR, 12. 
21
 NSS, 6. 
22
 Ibid, 14. 
23
 Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in 
Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on al Qaeda (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 2002), 16. 
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 3.  Compellence 
 The concept of compellence is generally accepted to be 
separate from the concept of deterrence, but it is related 
to deterrence in that a particular, undesirable behavior of 
an adversary is expected to change in response to a U.S. 
pledge of action.  In the framework of the NSS, those 
hostile states and organizations that possess WMD, 
proliferate WMD, practice terrorism or support terrorism in 
any way are given notice that the United States will not 
tolerate that behavior and demands a stop to it.  The 
soundness of demanding that a terrorist organization end 
its practice of terrorism may be questionable, but the 
method of compellence is easily comprehendible.  The United 
States commits itself to “direct and continuous action 
using all the elements of national and international 
power.”24  In other words, the United States will continue 
to inflict punishment until its potential adversaries no 
longer pursue terrorism or WMD.  As addressed further in 
Chapter III, compellence is not synonymous with deterrence, 
nor are its assumptions regarding the initiation of action 
the same;25 however, the fact that some international actors 
are already engaged in behavior that the United States has 
declared unacceptable in the NSS requires that compellence 
serve as a companion strategy to deterrence in order to 
accomplish U.S. objectives regarding terrorism and WMD. 
 4.  Positive Deterrence 
 Positive deterrence involves the use of incentives or 
rewards, rather than threats or punishment, to persuade 
compliance with U.S. demands.26  Although positive 
                         
24
 NSS, 6. 
25
 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1966), 69-71. 
26
 Johnson, Mueller and Taft, 16. 
  
 
 15  
deterrence is not directly mentioned in the NSS, the 
strategy still resides in the “toolbox” of U.S. policy 
makers.  Positive deterrence might be employed with those 
states that could be involved in support for terrorism or 
in WMD proliferation but indicate a willingness to alter 
their behavior due to concern over the U.S. stance on the 
policies or the policies’ relative insignificance in 
overall state strategy.  As an example from the post-
September 11 period, it might be argued that Pakistan was 
enticed to end its support for the Taliban in Afghanistan 
and join the United States in the “war or terrorism” in 
2001 through the U.S. practice of positive deterrence; as a 
result of the change in Pakistani policy, President Bush 
signed legislation that ended sanctions and renewed 
economic and military aid to Pakistan on October 30, 2001.27  
Positive deterrence can be most effective for the United 
States when combined with other methods of deterrence; not 
only was Pakistan rewarded for its change of policy, but it 
was also indirectly threatened through a statement of 
President Bush: 
And we will pursue nations that provide aid or 
safe haven to terrorism.  Every nation, in every 
region, now has a decision to make. Either you 
are with us, or you are with the terrorists.  
From this day forward, any nation that continues 
to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded 
by the United States as a hostile regime.28 
C.  SUMMARY 
In sum, the new U.S. strategy of deterrence includes a 
combination of deterrence by punishment, deterrence by 
denial, compellence and positive deterrence.  The concept 
                         
27
 Editorial Staff, “Chronology: Pakistan,” The Middle East Journal 56 
(Spring 2002): 315. 
28
 President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress, 
Washington, DC, September 20, 2001. 
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of preemption constitutes the establishment of new 
parameters for deterrence by punishment, rather than a 
fundamental departure from the concept of deterrence.  A 
preemptive strike by the United States represents the 
failure of a deterrence situation in which the threat of a 
U.S. attack was the deterrent pledge of action and the 
activity of the opponent that the United States attempted 
to deter was something short of actual, overtly aggressive 
action or an attack on the United States; in the current 
deterrence situation, the United States pledges military or 
other action if an opponent fails to comply with the U.S. 
demand to avoid the use or support of terrorism and the use 
or acquisition of WMD.  The U.S. Department of Defense is 
pursuing four defense policy goals, all of which contribute 
to the NCA’s ability to practice deterrence with the 
leverage of effective military means, but U.S. pledges of 
action in deterrence efforts are not always necessarily 
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CHAPTER III. FRAMING THE NEW CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE 
 
A.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACTORS IN DETERRENCE 
A review of literature on deterrence theories unveils 
numerous definitions of the concept and even more proposals 
of the confines in which the concept should be studied.  
Since the United States intends to practice deterrence 
rather than study it, a useful, workable model of 
deterrence theory should probably be based on a well-
understood fusion of ideas surrounding a broad definition 
of the concept. 
 Several theorists begin their presentations of 
deterrence theory with a description of the conditions 
surrounding the relationship between two parties that may 
come into conflict.  For example, Patrick Morgan identifies 
manipulation via threat as the essence of deterrence: 
“Deterrence involves manipulating someone’s behavior by 
threatening him with harm.”29  However, most theorists then 
narrow their definitions of deterrence for the purpose of 
study.  Morgan shifts to a concept in which “deterrence 
involves the threat to use force in response as a way of 
preventing the first use of force by someone else.”30  
Before concentrating on the use of force as a prerequisite 
for a definition of deterrence, however, the relationship 
between opposing actors should be better defined.  
Especially for the U.S. attempt to employ a new concept of 
deterrence, the establishment of the nature of competition 
between opposing wills is the most important factor in 
defining a strategy of deterrence. 
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 The manipulation of an opponent’s decision making is 
probably a suitable base for a consideration of deterrence.  
Many studies of deterrence incorporate the opponent’s cost-
benefit analysis as an integral part of the deterrence 
relationship.  Alexander George and Richard Smoke provide a 
description of this relationship that appears, with minor 
variations, in much of the literature: deterrence involves 
“persuasion of one’s opponent that the costs and/or risks 
of a given course of action he might take outweigh its 
benefits.”31  The object is to increase the inherent costs 
of an action for the opponent to the point at which he 
determines that it is not in his best interest to pursue 
that action.  The costs are increased for the opponent by a 
U.S. pledge of some type of action, most often, but not 
necessarily, the threat of the use of force against 
something of value to the opponent.  The relationship can 
be represented as, “If you do A, the United States will do 
B,”32 with the U.S. intention of making its opponent 
conclude that B is more costly than A is beneficial. 
 Deterrence takes place in the mind of the opponent, 
not in any physical application of national power.  
Deterrence is a state of mind in which the opponent chooses 
to be deterred.  “An enemy who chooses to be deterred is an 
enemy who chooses to subordinate his will to ours.”33  Since 
the opponent has an independent will and values objectives 
and interests of which the United States can never be 
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certain, the United States can make no pledge of action 
that will be assured of deterring its opponent. 
 The method by which a model of deterrence supposes 
that an opponent might conclude that subordinating his will 
to that of the United States is in his best interest is 
through a rational decision making process.  The assumption 
of deterrence is that the opponent will consider the costs 
and benefits of pursuing his original intentions, in light 
of the pledge of action from the United States, and his 
decision for action or inaction will be based on that 
course he deems to be most beneficial and/or least costly.  
Mutual deterrence might take place when, upon exchanging 
threats over a single issue, both the United States and its 
opponent determine that the least costly or most beneficial 
course of action is to subordinate the goals of each to the 
more favorable prospect of a status quo peace. 
The assumption of rationality is a point which several 
deterrence theorists find problematic.  One problem is that 
a poor understanding of an opponent may lead to a poor 
understanding of what constitutes a rational decision on 
its part.  For example, a national leader might value the 
personal pride he finds in defying the United States more 
than the preservation of his life, but the United States 
might view this value system as irrational.  Another 
problem is simply being able to identify an opponent as 
rational or not.  Past rational behavior does not indicate 
that an actor will behave rationally in the future, nor 
does past irrationality indicate future irrationality.  
Additionally, a distinction should be drawn between 
rational decision-making and the rationality of an 
opponent’s objectives; an opponent could have a completely 
irrational objective (or an objective that the United 
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States perceives to be irrational) but still make a 
rational decision based on costs and benefits.34  While it 
may be assumed that there exist some crazy or completely 
irrational actors in the international system, most actors 
probably consider the consequences of their actions to some 
degree prior to acting.  Morgan suggests that no one is 
capable of perfect rationality when faced with a situation 
of “threat and reaction, a complex psychological phenomenon 
with obvious roots in the emotional equipment of man,” so 
parties to deterrence should be expected to make “sensible” 
decisions, with some influence from irrational objectives 
and perceptions.35  Deterrence does not require complete, 
pure rationality in decision making; it only requires that 
the decision maker not be completely irrational.36 
 A good deal of literature on deterrence presents a 
relationship between only two opposing parties.  George and 
Smoke suggest that the polarization of the deterrence 
relationship grew out of the bipolarity of the Cold War and 
the academic emphasis on nuclear deterrence.37  However, 
deterrence relationships can exist between multiple 
parties, as in the cases of extended deterrence, whereby a 
U.S. pledge of action deters an opponent’s action against a 
tertiary interest, friend or ally38 (for example, the U.S. 
pledge to defend Saudi Arabia might have been a case of 
successful extended deterrence against Iraq in 1990).  The 
same is true of general deterrence, whereby the United 
States might issue a threat to a general audience of 
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unspecified opponents that might threaten a generally 
specified interest.  Examples include, President Carter’s 
statement that 
any attempt by an outside force to gain control 
of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an 
assault on the vital interests of the United 
States of America, and such an assault will be 
repelled by any means necessary, including 
military force,39 
or the statement of President Bush before a Joint Session 
of Congress in 2001 (quoted on page 15 of this thesis). 
 In sum, for the new U.S. concept of deterrence, an 
understanding of the deterrence relationship should include 
the following factors: 
 The United States must pledge action against something 
of value to an opponent to cause it to conclude 
through a costs and benefits analysis that 
subordinating its will to that of the United States is 
more beneficial to it than defying the United States. 
 An opponent must choose to be deterred.  Successfully 
persuading it to subordinate its will to the U.S. will 
requires an understanding of its values and 
objectives. 
 Pure rationality in the decision making of an opponent 
is not required for deterrence, only a lack of 
complete irrationality. 
 Deterrence need not always concern a relationship 
between only two parties. 
B.  THE SCOPE OF DETERRENCE 
Nuclear deterrence has been addressed as a subject 
distinct from conventional deterrence for ease of study and 
because of the scale of destruction at stake in a nuclear 
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exchange.  Today, however, the lack of a superpower 
standoff, the questionable intentions of smaller nuclear 
powers, and the advances in conventional weaponry might 
cause the two subjects to be conceptually closer than 
during the Cold War.  Gary Guertner argues that the current 
superiority of the U.S. armed forces allows it to be used 
as a much more fearsome deterrent threat than ever before.  
Particularly, technological advances give U.S. conventional 
forces the range, accuracy, survivability, lethality and 
ability to strike a wide spectrum of targets, making them 
possess essentially the same qualities as nuclear weapons 
without the moral abhorrence accompanying their use.40  
Additionally, while facing a security environment of 
uncertain threats and potential enemies armed with WMD, 
U.S. nuclear forces may be used as a deterrent threat in 
conjunction with U.S. conventional forces, offering a 
variety of military options to rapidly meet any security 
challenge, under generally the same planning framework as 
the Cold War strategy of flexible response.41 
The specific circumstances concerning the substance of 
threats and the exchange of threats between parties lead to 
disparities between the works of many seemingly like-minded 
deterrence theorists.  John Mearsheimer restricts the 
conditions of conventional deterrence to those situations 
in which the seizure of territory is the action to be 
deterred.42  Under those parameters, an attempt by Israel to 
use threats of retaliation to dissuade Iran from launching 
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missiles at Tel Aviv does not constitute a deterrence 
situation.  Mearsheimer also only includes those situations 
in which the exchange of threats by two parties concern a 
military confrontation on a battlefield, so the threat of 
guerilla warfare is outside the scope of deterrence.43  
Mearsheimer further restricts his definition by confining 
the exchange of threats to military targets.44  Under those 
conditions, a threat to terrorize a population through 
saturation bombing does not constitute a deterrent threat.  
In a vein similar to Mearsheimer but more inclusive, Morton 
Halerpin confines deterrence to the use of military force 
to prevent military action of an adversary.45 
Conversely George and Smoke observe that in modern 
times, deterrence increasingly concerns the ability to 
punish the enemy while leaving its military intact and 
deterrence in situations outside of nuclear confrontations 
is dominated by political and diplomatic concerns much more 
than by tactical military concerns.46  Rather than limiting 
the scope of deterrence to military threats, pledges of 
action other than military, such as economic sanctions or 
international isolation via proposals for punitive United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs), might be 
used as deterrents as well.47  By extension, the opponent’s 
potential action that causes deterrence to be necessary 
might also be a threat other than a pending military 
attack.  As a contemporary example of an other than 
military deterrence situation, the United States might 
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level a threat of suspending aid or invoking trade 
sanctions against a state that has expressed sympathy for 
and might offer assistance to al Qaeda.  Paul Huth and 
Bruce Russett propose the additional facet of positive 
deterrence through making use of both carrot and stick; 
they suggest that promises of rewards for compliance can be 
offered or combined with threats of punishment to help make 
defiance of U.S. will less attractive.48 
 In defining the concept in academic terms, many 
scholars restrict deterrence to state versus state 
competition, with an understanding that the state is a 
unitary actor.  These confines were set in earlier decades 
when states were the only actors of significance in the 
international system that could threaten each other with 
significant harm.  In writing about nuclear deterrence in 
1968, Roy Jones observed that 
the penalties involved can only be applied by 
possessors of nuclear weapons and these are the 
authorities of nation-states.  At some time in 
the future this situation may change, but such a 
development is as yet unlikely.49 
Today’s security environment has changed.  The physical 
threats of nuclear and conventional warfare are joined by 
cyber-war, WMD and asymmetric attacks of varying types, and 
the threatening actors have increased from only nation-
states to include terrorists, insurgents, drug traffickers, 
organized crime, warlords, and religious extremists.50  
Despite some actors’ lack of geographic borders and 
military facilities, the United States can still attempt to 
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deter them from specific actions; intelligence and 
targeting may be more difficult, but all these actors most 
likely have something they hold as valuable that the United 
States might threaten.  As Michael Carns recommends, the 
United States must adopt a broad strategy of deterrence for 
“the Russian bear, Asian Dragons, and 1,000 snakes.”51  All 
targets of U.S. deterrence strategy also do not have to be 
considered unitary actors; as Davis and Jenkins suggest 
about terrorist organizations,52 non-state actors might be 
considered as systems with many component parts that might 
be targeted individually.  Similarly, a detailed 
understanding of a nation-state’s power bases and decision-
making process might allow component parts, such as 
military leadership, political parties, merchant elites, or 
religious leaders, to be the targets of U.S. deterrent 
threats. 
Many scholars agree that a central presumption in 
deterrence is that the pledge of action is delivered only 
in response to the attack or action of the opponent.53  In 
other words, under more traditional concepts of deterrence, 
the United States would pledge action (for example, the 
bombing of the opponent’s air bases) that would be executed 
only after the United States had absorbed the initial 
strikes of the enemy’s attack.  Furthermore, the pending 
action by the opponent is often assumed to be, if not 
imminent (as in the case of immediate deterrence), then 
likely or inevitable (as in the case of general 
deterrence).  Art and Waltz frame deterrence as a means to 
prevent an attack that would come in the absence of the 
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deterrent threat.54  Success in deterrence would be marked 
by the opponent’s decision to not attack as well as the 
absence of the pledged U.S. attack.  Under the present 
conditions in which the United States is unwilling to take 
the chance that an attack similar to the attacks of 
September 11 will come at all, the United States seeks to 
deter not only attacks that would come in the absence of 
deterrence, based on a knowledge of the opponent’s 
intentions, but also attacks that might come, based only on 
the capability of the opponent.  A U.S. attack on an 
opponent due to the opponent’s possession of a threatening 
capability, such as WMD, meets a definition of preventive 
war: “[Preventive war] is a calculated attempt by [the 
United States] to destroy country B’s military forces, not 
because B has aggressed but because B might aggress and 
might use its weapons” (emphasis added).55  However, under a 
new U.S. concept of deterrence, the above-described 
preventive war could simply represent the consequences of a 
deterrence failure in which the United States specifically 
informed country B that it would be attacked if it acquired 
specified weapons, such as WMD. 
In sum, various scholars have put limits on the 
definition of deterrence for ease of study and clarity of 
communication, but the conception of deterrence that 
provides the United States with the most flexibility in 
confronting a wide variety of threats from a wide variety 
of actors should be very broad and consider the following: 
 Considering today’s threat environment and the 
technological advances of conventional weaponry, 
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nuclear deterrence should not be considered a strategy 
separate from other deterrence.  Nuclear weapons have 
a place on a continuum of U.S. force to be used in 
deterrence failures, and some conventional weaponry 
might have the effect of being just as fearful or 
punishing as exclusively nuclear weapons were in the 
past.  Of course, considering the taboo on the use of 
nuclear weapons both among the U.S. population and in 
the international arena, their use in deterrence 
failures must be carefully weighed to ensure that the 
benefits of use are greater than the costs. 
 Any U.S. pledge of action in response to an 
undesirable activity of an opponent constitutes a 
deterrent effort.  The U.S. pledge of action could 
entail the leveraging of military, diplomatic, 
political, economic or informational power in the form 
of a punishment, instrument of denial, or reward.  The 
undesirable activity of an opponent could be a 
conventional or nuclear military attack, terrorist 
attack, or WMD attack, but it need not be an attack at 
all; the undesirable activity could be anything 
identified by the United States as undesirable, such 
as acquisition of WMD or the precursor materials, 
providing financial or materiel support for 
terrorists, or engaging in the training of terrorists. 
 Nation-states need not be the only opponents targeted 
through U.S. deterrence efforts. 
 U.S. adversaries might be targeted for deterrence as 
unitary actors, or the component parts of the actors’ 
“system” might be targeted individually. 
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 The necessity of executing the action pledged by the 
United States constitutes a deterrence failure.  The 
action pledged is executed in response to a failure to 
comply with the U.S. will.  The United States is 
responsible for defining its will to its opponent in 
advance.  The U.S. will in a deterrence situation need 
not be limited to a desire to not be attacked by its 
opponent; the U.S. will might be to limit its 
opponent’s capabilities by ensuring its opponent does 
not possess the precursor materials for WMD. 
 A U.S. action that might be labeled preemption or 
preventive war can represent a deterrence failure, but 
only if the pledge of the “preemptive” attack had been 
communicated in advance and tied to a particular 
behavior of the opponent. 
C.  THE COMPANION STRATEGY OF COMPELLENCE 
 The primary threats identified in the NSS are 
terrorism and WMD.  The United States seeks to influence 
the global security environment in such a way as to remove 
these threats.  The new strategy of deterrence might be 
effective in preventing opponents from acquiring WMD, from 
supporting terrorism and from practicing terrorism, but 
deterrence cannot prevent something that has already 
happened; several actors today possess WMD or the precursor 
materials, and several actors today support terrorism.  
Reversing a state’s action requires compellence. 
 Deterrence is basically a passive strategy.  Action is 
only executed by the United States if deterrence fails.  
The initiative lies with the opponent;56 it decides whether 
or not to act.  Compellence is an active strategy.  The 
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concept might be represented as, “until you do A, the 
United States will continue to do B,” or as, “unless you do 
A by my deadline, I will do B.”57  Compellence requires that 
the initiative lie with the United States; the United 
States decides to act to induce a change of behavior in an 
opponent.  While the United States could be bluffing when 
issuing pledges of action to an opponent in a deterrence 
situation, the sincerity and commitment of the United 
States is more evident in compellence because the United 
States has to be the first to act, and in order for the 
action to succeed in compelling the opponent, the action 
presumably cannot cease until the opponent responds.58 
 Compellence, like deterrence, requires at least a 
degree of rationality in an opponent in that it is expected 
to weigh the costs and benefits of continuing a particular 
behavior.  The United States seeks to persuade its opponent 
to conclude that, faced with the prospect of enduring the 
U.S. action directed against it, the value of abandoning a 
course of action is greater than the value of continuing a 
course of action.  Also as in deterrence, the “something” 
that is targeted in compellence must be valuable to the 
opponent, actors other than nation-states can be the 
opponents targeted for compellence, the opponents do not 
have to be targeted as unitary actors, and the action taken 
by the United States does not necessarily have to involve 
the use of military force. 
 While there are many challenges and potential pitfalls 
involved in practicing deterrence, compellence is 
considered much more difficult to achieve because of the 
psychological and political costs of reversing an “attack;” 
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it is presumed to be much easier to live without a 
desirable thing than it is to surrender that thing.59 
D.  INTEGRATING THE NEW CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE INTO THE 
 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
 The Bush administration has taken the stance that 
deterrence will not be effective in meeting all the 
challenges of today’s security environment.  Even within 
the confines of the more predictable, bipolar security 
environment of the Cold War, it is worth noting that the 
more traditional concepts of deterrence were admittedly far 
from able to guarantee success.  Even with today’s 
expansion in variety of threats and potentially threatening 
actors, however, deterrence might serve as one effective 
strategy for securing U.S. interests in many cases. 
The recommended broadened conception of deterrence 
allows the United States to confront, through deterrence, a 
wide spectrum of opponents, from long-established nation-
states to shadowy terrorist organizations, that might 
threaten the United States via a wide spectrum of harm, 
from a nuclear attack to a more limited asymmetric strike 
of a perhaps never before experienced nature.  The new U.S. 
concept of deterrence includes deterrence by punishment, 
deterrence by denial, and positive deterrence.  Due to the 
perceived necessity of reversing some existing threats, 
compellence, a companion strategy of coercion, should be 
employed along with deterrence.  The United States might 
employ military, economic, diplomatic, political or 
informational power as its pledged coercive action to 
influence its opponents. 
The broadened concept of deterrence also accommodates 
the Bush administration’s apparent bias for action in 
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meeting threats before the United States absorbs additional 
catastrophic attacks of the caliber of the attacks of 
September 11.   Preventive war and preemption remain 
concepts distinct from deterrence, but the U.S. 
construction of a series of diplomatic tripwires allows the 
actions involved in preventive war and preemption to be 
used as deterrent threats to potential adversaries.  The 
deterrence relationship does not change due to a threat of 
preventive war, only the opponent’s contingent action 
changes.  The “line in the sand” has been redrawn closer to 
the opponent than to the United States; the deterrence 
situation is still represented by “if you do A, the United 
States will do B,” but today the United States has 
communicated that A may now be defined as the acquisition 
of a capability (for example) rather than as an attack on 
the United States. 
The NSS was published a year after the QDR, but the 
QDR is still a supporting document to the NSS.  As a 
national strategy, deterrence is not practiced by the 
Department of Defense; it is practiced by the nation.  The 
Department of Defense has set defense policy goals for 
itself, which facilitate the practice of deterrence, and is 
formulating the concept of “deter forward,” but the 
Department of Defense is only a deterrent tool.  Defense 
policy serves the national strategy.  “Success in 
deterrence cannot be reduced to buying more, or better, 
military forces, to superior intelligence, to genius in 
command, to competence in logistics,”60 but all these 
Department of Defense capabilities and activities set the 
conditions of understanding U.S. opponents and lending 
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credibility to U.S. threats which are essential for 
successful deterrence.  Furthermore, the Department of 
Defense might set “deterrence” as a goal, but it must be 
recognized that “we do not just deter; rather, we deter 
someone from doing something.”  As such, the NSS, not the 
QDR, should be viewed as the primary document to understand 
the U.S. strategy of deterrence. 
The United States will be well served by working under 
a very broad concept of deterrence, but the establishment 
of a deterrent relationship with an opponent is reliant on 
clearly communicated, credible, contingent pledges of 
action, not just on the forward presence of armed forces.  
Recent events have proven that the U.S. maintenance of the 
most powerful military in the world does not serve as a 
deterrent in itself.  The identification of the methods by 
which the new strategy of deterrence should be employed 
will bring to light the numerous challenges inherent in any 
strategy of deterrence, but more particularly, the 
challenges of confronting a wide variety of actors in 
today’s security environment.  An examination of the 
essential elements in deterrence of knowledge of the 
opponent, identification of what to target, determination 
of the best means of targeting it, clear communication of 
the threat across cultural barriers, possession of the 
capability, and conveyance of credibility will show the 
significant obstacles that the United States must overcome 
in implementing the new concept of deterrence successfully 
and will validate the Bush administration’s concern that 
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CHAPTER IV. CHALLENGES FOR IMPLEMENTING A NEW 
CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE 
 
 Deterrence is by no means a foolproof strategy.  It is 
even extremely difficult to identify historic cases of 
deterrence failures or successes because the political and 
strategic dynamics that cause a state to follow a 
particular course of action cannot be accurately assessed 
in the absence of testimony from the decision makers.  
Without turning to interviews, speeches or memoirs (which 
may or may not be truthful or complete) to determine the 
thought process of decision makers, the assessed reason 
that a state backed down or continued with a planned attack 
when faced with a deterrent threat may likely be 
inaccurate.  For example, it is nearly impossible to 
determine if in October 1994, Iraq’s failure to attack 
Kuwait can be considered a deterrence success on the part 
of the United States, which deployed troops in response to 
Iraqi massing of troops in southern Iraq under Operation 
Vigilant Warrior, or if Iraq never intended to attack 
Kuwait in the first place, making the U.S. deterrent threat 
irrelevant, or if Saddam Hussein’s decision not to attack 
Kuwait was made with almost no regard for the U.S. 
deterrent threat.  Because deterrence is a difficult 
subject to study, there is no formula for assured success.  
However, an examination of interstate relations suggests 
that particular challenges face the United States in its 
attempt to persuade others to avoid activities that might 
threaten U.S. interests. 
A.  INTELLIGENCE 
 The strategic concept of “deter forward” includes an 
emphasis on intelligence capabilities that is absolutely 
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vital to successful deterrence.  The goal of intelligence 
needs to be much broader than the stated focus on 
“adversaries’ intentions, plans, strengths, and 
weaknesses”61 however.  In addition to information about 
strengths and weaknesses of all elements of an opponent’s 
national power and how it might employ it, intelligence 
about the opponent must include an intimate, wide-spanning 
understanding of the opponent’s culture, decision-making 
process and value structure.62  This understanding allows 
U.S. policy makers to choose the right target for 
deterrence, to predict what policy options will be viable 
for the opponent, to grasp how the opponent will calculate 
its costs versus benefits,63 and to realize that while the 
opponent’s decision making may be rational, its goals might 
seem completely unrealizable. 
 1.  Capabilities versus Intentions 
 Having focus on an opponent’s intentions more than on 
its capabilities is important for the United States 
deterrence effort.  A consideration of only an opponent’s 
capabilities can lead to a situation in which all foreign 
militaries are viewed as threats by the United States.  An 
acknowledgement of the importance of intentions allows the 
United States to relieve itself of the burden of planning 
for a military confrontation with non-aggressive states 
that have significant military capabilities such as Great 
Britain, for example.  Intelligence gathering on intentions 
of potential foes gives policy makers a better 
understanding of its opponents so that they are able to 
determine which opponents constitute realistic threats. 
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 The United States has not yet moved away from its 
focus on national capabilities that dominated the 
deterrence equation during the Cold War.  As outlined in 
Chapter II, the QDR states that the United States intends 
to ensure that it remains free from any future military 
competition.64  While this defense policy goal will help 
serve to guarantee U.S. security through periods of 
uncertain political tide changes for the foreseeable 
future, it focuses on the capabilities, not intentions, of 
friends and foes alike.  Defense planning that ensures the 
indefinite dominance of the U.S. military as a stand-alone 
force has the effect of serving as an instrument of 
deterrence by denial, but it also has the potential effect 
of instilling fear in countries which, in the absence of a 
dominating U.S. military, might not view the United States 
as a foe.  Potentially benign state actors, instead of 
seeing the United States as a country which is only trying 
to benevolently safeguard its global interests, might view 
the U.S. military dominance of the international arena as a 
direct threat to their own national interests; a potential 
result is a military escalation, described well by Robert 
Jervis or Charles L. Glaser, as the spiral model.65  The 
maintenance of a globally deploying, peerless U.S. military 
can cause insecurity in states that otherwise might have no 
dispute with the United States; out of insecurity in the 
face of a regionally intrusive U.S. military, a potential 
foe may feel the need to build up its own defenses, an 
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activity which the United States will view as threatening 
and aggressive, causing the United States to become 
confrontational, causing the potential foe to grow 
confrontational in turn, et cetera.  In effect, the foe’s 
attempt to decrease its insecurity as a result of the 
perceived threat of the U.S. military may actually drive it 
to acquire WMD to make it less vulnerable.  It is very 
important, therefore, that in deciding to follow a strategy 
of deterrence, the United States ensures that not only does 
its targeted foe possess the capabilities to harm U.S. 
interests, but it also possesses the intentions.  U.S. 
intelligence would also be useful if it can determine 
whether any ill intentions of an adversary might solely be 
the result of the adversary’s insecurity in the face of 
U.S. capabilities or policies. 
Additionally, according to the NSS, the Bush 
administration views the acquisition of WMD or WMD 
precursor materials by potential foes as threats to U.S. 
national security.  As such, the Bush administration is 
again focusing on capabilities rather than on intentions.  
While there is no denying that in the hands of malicious 
parties, WMD could be used for catastrophic effects against 
U.S. targets, the effort to deter all states from acquiring 
WMD is enormous and necessarily rather unfocused in terms 
of the deterrence of a particular target with a particular 
threat.  General deterrence might be employed as a 
strategy, but since the U.S. concern centers on a 
capability rather than an intention or action, that general 
deterrent threat will almost certainly lack consistency of 
response by the United States, degrading the credibility of 
the threat.  For example, the United States (perhaps 
understandably) had a different response to North Korea’s 
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nuclear program during the last year than it did for Iraq’s 
suspected chemical and biological weapons programs.  This 
inconsistency may be viewed by other WMD-seeking states as 
a lack of commitment to its pledge to prevent WMD 
proliferation.  The North Korea case may also lead weaker 
states to conclude that by acquiring WMD, they also acquire 
diplomatic strength or bargaining power.  The seeking of 
WMD by weaker states might even be considered to have the 
deterrent effect of restraining the options of the United 
States; the more frightening a threat (WMD employment 
against the United States), the less credible the threat 
needs to be.66  The United States is putting itself into a 
position in which it is committed to expending a lot of 
effort and treasure to discover the possible existence of 
WMD anywhere; any international actor has the ability to 
cause the United States to needlessly expend its resources 
by suggesting that it might be interested in acquiring WMD. 
 2.  Customizing Deterrent Threats 
 Considering the countless differences between the many 
potential U.S. adversaries, general deterrent threats will 
not be as effective as specific threats to specific 
targets.  U.S. intelligence needs to focus on gaining an 
intimate understanding of adversaries such that policy 
makers will be able to customize U.S. deterrent threats.  
Each target of deterrence will have something that it holds 
dear, and determining what that thing is takes knowledge of 
the adversary’s culture, the leaders’ psychology and value 
structure, and the composition of and pressures upon the 
decision making body or individual. 
 The United States must not assume that in acting 
rationally the decision makers of other states will arrive 
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at the same conclusions as an American who might weigh 
costs and benefits when faced with the same deterrence 
situation.  Understanding of culture and values can help to 
appropriately target an adversary.  For example, in 
fighting the Japanese during World War II, it was vital 
that U.S. planners understood that those who adhered to the 
code of Bushido valued honor above survival; likewise, it 
was unfortunate that President Bush described the War on 
Terrorism as a crusade without appreciation for the memory 
that term can invoke in Muslims. 
 Understanding of the opposing leaders’ values is 
similarly important and should be a target of intelligence.  
Rational decision-making requires that the adversary weigh 
the costs and benefits of a particular course of action 
before making a decision on whether acting or not acting is 
in its best interest.  However, no two parties weigh costs 
and benefits in the same way.  U.S. intelligence needs to 
provide information that will lead to an understanding of 
an opponent’s value structure so that U.S. policy makers 
can choose the most appropriate target for a deterrent 
threat.  For example, many leaders might value their 
ability to remain in power more than the well-being of 
their citizenries; if that is the case, then economic 
sanctions might not be appropriate as deterrent threats to 
these adversaries if their leaders are confident that 
economic discontent will not lead to their removal from 
power. 
 When formulating a strategy of deterrence, it is also 
important to have an understanding of exactly how decisions 
are made by the U.S. adversary.  Popular opinion within the 
adversary’s state might serve as an excellent pressure 
point for some, and exerting U.S. influence among 
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opposition political parties might prove effective with 
others.  Similarly, U.S. policy makers need to understand 
exactly who makes decisions in an opponent’s state in order 
to effectively make a deterrent threat.  As examples, 
Iran’s multifaceted power structure often makes it unclear 
who speaks on behalf of the state, and since the death of 
Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad, it is debatable how much 
decision making authority actually lies in the hands of his 
son, the current President. 
 3.  Reliability of Intelligence 
 The decision to invade Iraq in March 2003 has been the 
subject of much debate.  Opponents of the decision have 
pointed to the U.S. military’s inability to locate WMD to 
date.  Opponents also suggest that while Iraq might have 
possessed some capabilities to inflict harm upon U.S. 
interests, there was no firm evidence that Iraq had any 
intention of attacking U.S. interests directly or through 
cooperation with non-state actors.  Regardless of what 
light the separation of years will have on historians’ 
perspectives on the decision to invade, it is clear that 
the decision to invade, which might be considered the 
result of a deterrence failure as argued in Chapter V, was 
the culmination of U.S. strategy toward Iraq and was 
heavily influenced by the intelligence that U.S. policy 
makers had at their disposal.  Since that intelligence has 
been called into question to date, policy makers should be 
aware that the aggressiveness of the new concept of 
deterrence requires that the U.S. intelligence effort be 
consistently intense and that the accuracy of intelligence 
is essential not only for effective deterrence, but also 
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B.  REQUIREMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 
 1.  Capability 
 There can be little dispute that the armed forces of 
the United States are the best equipped and trained in the 
world.  Likewise, the United States can leverage among the 
world’s most influential economic, political, informational 
and diplomatic powers against its foes.  Especially if not 
committed in other contests, the United States has no 
problem in convincing would-be adversaries that it 
possesses the capability to inflict harm.  However, as 
elements of the U.S. military are deployed for various 
commitments around the world, the credibility of the United 
States reacting to several more deterrence failures or 
other conflicts simultaneously begins to wane.  U.S. policy 
makers need to be aware that the credibility of deterrent 
threats might increase due to the United States following 
through with the deterrent threats it had made (against 
Iraq, for example), but with each deterrence failure in 
quick succession, the credibility of U.S. capabilities 
might decrease due to over-commitment.67  By the same token, 
the commitment of other elements of national power in 
response to deterrence threats also can decrease in 
credibility with a series of several deterrence failures; 
Congress might object to committing more money overseas, or 
the aggressiveness of U.S. actions might cause it to lose 
some diplomatic influence among its allies. 
 2.  Communication 
 In a strategy of deterrence, communication with the 
U.S. opponent is essential.  The U.S. adversary cannot be 
expected to restrain itself in a deterrence situation if 
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the threats are not clearly communicated across cultural 
barriers.68  The clarity of communication lends credibility 
to the threat.69  In the absence of clear threats to 
opponents, the infliction of U.S. punishments in deterrence 
failures might make the U.S. punishments appear erratic and 
cause other adversaries to adopt highly defensive postures 
against perceived random, unpredictable U.S. use of force.  
A possible problem with current U.S. deterrence efforts is 
that the deterrent threat is often communicated in language 
similar to “grave consequences.”  In the absence of 
specific threats to adversaries, the adversaries are forced 
to infer the consequences of their actions based on U.S. 
military capabilities or past U.S. actions.70  In some 
cases, the inference drawn might be good for U.S. 
deterrence efforts, as in the case of reflection on the 
invasion of Iraq, but in other cases, the inferences might 
be drawn from less fearsome U.S. action, such as the U.S. 
withdrawal from Somalia.  Equally as important as the clear 
communication of threats is the communication of    U.S. 
concerns, motivations, commitment and intentions.71  Just as 
in the case of vague threats, a U.S. failure to communicate 
exactly what it plans to defend, to what extent and why 
leaves the opponent to infer U.S. interests and 
commitment.72  While the Bush administration has been fairly 
clear in communicating the types of behavior it will not 
tolerate, U.S. concerns, commitment and intentions might 
still appear uncertain; for example, the United States 
pledges to fight terrorist organizations and stop the 
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proliferation of WMD, but it has not responded with 
punishment for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri 
Lanka or for North Korea. 
 Since the success of deterrence depends upon the 
opponent’s rational decision that not acting is more 
beneficial or less costly than acting, it is also important 
that the United States communicate assurances that if its 
opponent behaves agreeably, then the threatened punishment 
will be withheld.  The United States has done a poor job 
since September 11 in assuring its would-be foes that it 
will withhold punishment if its opponents fail to act.  For 
example, among other things, the United States objects to 
Iran’s suspected pursuit of nuclear weapons and support for 
terrorist activity of Hezbollah; however, the United States 
has given Iran no reason to believe that if it sincerely 
renounced or stopped the offending activities that the 
United States would end economic sanctions or cease its 
support for Iranian opposition movements that aim to 
overthrow the Iranian government.  Iran, therefore, has 
little incentive to alter its behavior in terms of its 
relations with the United States.  Likewise, although the 
U.S. strategy toward terrorist organizations might best be 
described as compellence instead of deterrence, the 
terrorist organizations should have little confidence that 
if they completely end all terrorist activities then they 
will be allowed to exist as social or political 
organizations by the United States.  If a U.S. foe 
determines it will be punished regardless of what course of 
action it adopts, then it will pursue a beneficial 
activity, regardless of the U.S. deterrent threat; 
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deterrence becomes meaningless without assurance that the 
threat will be withheld under certain circumstances.73 
 3.  Punishments 
 In the case of deterrence failures, the United States 
must be prepared to follow through on its threats of 
punishment.  The more severe the punishment, the more 
effective the deterrence failure will be in aiding future 
extended deterrence.  Robert J. Art points out that one of 
the possible reasons for the frequent failure of coercive 
diplomacy is that the violence inflicted on the U.S. 
opponent is not harmful enough to cause the opponent to 
change its policies.74  Similarly in deterrence, the 
opponent must be made to feel that it has something 
substantial to lose.  When offering lesser threats, the 
United States runs the risk that some opponents might even 
welcome a limited amount of punishment in order to gather 
anti-U.S. support around them or to drive a wedge between 
the United States and its allies. 
 As argued in Chapter II, due to the nature of 
deterrence within the NSS, deterrence failures could result 
from instances short of an attack on the United States or 
on U.S. interests, and the punishments inflicted as a 
result of those deterrence failures could take the form of 
attacks that could be described as preemptive or 
preventive.  This situation puts the United States in a 
position that might easily be described as that of an 
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aggressor state.  For example, there are many Americans who 
opposed the invasion of Iraq because they did not identify 
Iraq as a threat to the United States, and many actors in 
the international arena agreed.  Within the framework of 
the new concept of deterrence as exercised under the NSS, 
the United States stands the chance of exercising other 
military attacks as a result of deterrence failures that 
will not be caused by any attacks upon U.S. interests or by 
evidence of imminent attacks on U.S. interests; the 
acquisition of WMD by a would-be foe might be enough for 
the United States to respond with an attack.  The 
willingness to use force to destroy threats that are not 
yet fully formed may be a difficult concept for Americans 
to accept, but U.S. deterrence under the guidelines of the 
NSS requires that the United States be willing to effect 
these punishments.  Americans may tend to object to U.S. 
attacks in response to less than fully formed threats 
because they have been conditioned through the presentation 
of their history to believe that the U.S. military is 
employed only in the direct defense of the United States or 
in defense of a righteous cause.  Additionally, a national 
security strategy, in which the United States is so willing 
to use force, may have the effect of blurring the 
distinction between war and deterrence.75  Since    
September 11, U.S. deterrent threats and actions have 
focused largely on military engagements, but it would be 
useful if the policy makers include non-military 
punishments as threats as well. 
C.  OPPONENTS’ PERCEPTIONS AND THE U.S. REPUTATION 
 U.S. behavior in one deterrence situation or challenge 
is scrutinized by all potential foes.  The credibility of 
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the United States inflicting punishment may be low due to 
numerous instances from the last two decades in which the 
United States was attacked but did not respond forcefully.  
As examples, the bombing of the U. S embassy and Marine 
barracks in Beirut in 1983, the killing of U.S. soldiers in 
Somalia in 1993, the bombing of the Khobar Towers in 1996, 
the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 
1998, and the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 all resulted 
in U.S. withdrawals or very limited reprisals.  As a 
result, it is not unreasonable to conclude that foes of the 
United States might not believe that the United States will 
respond with force as a result of deterrence failures in 
the future.  The U.S. decisions for military action in 
Afghanistan and Iraq might serve to enhance the U.S. 
reputation for using force and serve as a deterrent to 
other states,76 but the reactive nature of these actions in 
the wake of the attacks of September 11 might just as 
easily lead U.S. adversaries to conclude that the current 
U.S. military action is an exception to the general rule of 
inaction, spurned by the extraordinary circumstances of the 
September 11 attacks.  Persistence in punishment for 
deterrence failures in the foreseeable future is required 
to establish the credibility of the U.S. threat and its 
resolve in opposing terrorism and the proliferation of 
WMD.77 
 The U.S. demonstration of resolve in Iraq does not 
necessarily lead other potential foes to conclude that the 
United States will act similarly in the future.  As a 
democracy, the United States bears the heavy burden of 
public opinion influencing its freedom of action.  As 
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operations in Iraq continue to produce U.S. casualties and 
cost billions of dollars, Americans who were originally 
opposed to the invasion might be joined by others who lack 
the patience to see the rebuilding of Iraq through to its 
conclusion.  The prospect of engaging another foe under 
similar circumstances in the near term will likely elicit 
little support from the American public.  Negative public 
opinion in response to an elected official’s threat to 
inflict punishment in a deterrence situation detracts from 
the credibility of that threat; the U.S. cost of inflicting 
punishment (in reputation among its allies, in billions of 
dollars, in the further commitment of a busy military, and 
in a lack of popular American support) as a result of a 
deterrence failure is considered by U.S. adversaries in 
assessing the credibility of U.S. threats.78  For example, a 
U.S. threat to invade an opponent’s state made during the 
fall of 2003 might not be viewed as very credible to the 
opponent; it seems unlikely that President Bush would 
willingly commit the U.S. military to an additional 
campaign while facing some American opposition to current 
campaigns in an election year unless vital U.S. interests 
were directly threatened.  Conversely, if a U.S. president 
delivered the U.S. threat in such a way as to stake his 
political career on delivering the punishment in the case 
of a deterrence failure, the threat’s credibility 
increases; there would be high costs for U. S policy makers 
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CHAPTER V. DETERRENCE FAILURE: IRAQ 2001-2003 
 
A.  POST-GULF WAR DETERRENCE SITUATION 
 On March 20, 2003 the armed forces of the United 
States began a deliberate attack into the sovereign 
territory of Iraq.  This action might be considered the 
culmination of the 1991 Gulf War, continued through 
OPERATION NORTHERN WATCH and OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH 
throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century; or it might 
be considered the failure of an ongoing U.S. policy of 
coercive diplomacy; or it might be considered the measured 
elimination of an enemy with whom the United States had 
irreconcilable differences.  For the purpose of this study, 
the invasion of Iraq is framed as a deterrence failure.  
While it might be argued that the nature of the U.S. 
demands on Iraq might make the relationship better 
characterized as compellence, that compellence, in the form 
of demands for disarmament and the admittance of United 
Nations (UN) weapons inspectors, was required as a result 
of the intrusive parameters set by the United States on its 
new deterrence situation with Iraq after September 11, 
2001.  The Iraqi case is instructive in that it 
demonstrates the forward-leaning practice of the new 
concept of deterrence, which may be required in future 
cases dealing with an opponent’s acquisition of WMD, as 
opposed to the more traditional, passive practice of 
deterrence. 
 U.S. relations with Iraq can be considered to have 
been relatively hostile since the end of the Gulf War.  The 
12 years that elapsed between the end of OPERATION DESERT 
STORM and the beginning of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM might be 
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framed as a period in which the United States practiced a 
strategy of deterrence against Iraq.  The United States, 
mostly through the formalities of UNSCRs, presented an 
explanation of behaviors that the United States considered 
unacceptable, such as unauthorized activity in the northern 
and southern no-fly zones.  The United States offered a 
threat of military retaliation for violations of these 
unacceptable behaviors.  The United States demonstrated its 
intent and resolve by forward deploying military forces 
within rapid striking distance of Iraq.  Upon violations of 
unacceptable behavior, or deterrence failures, the United 
States delivered the punishment that was promised in the 
event of Iraqi violations.  In most cases, the punishment 
inflicted by the United States was not answered by any 
Iraqi retaliation, so state-level relations reverted back 
to a nearly identical deterrence situation.  This cycle was 
repeated numerous times during the first 10 years of 
hostility with few cases of escalated violence or tension 
between the United States and Iraq.  The relationship 
between the United States and Iraq was one of traditional 
deterrence; the United States punished Iraq generally only 
in cases in which Iraq displayed hostile, military behavior 
that the United States had specifically forbid. 
 After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and 
the publication of the 2001 QDR, the U.S. conception of 
deterrence changed.  The cycle of Iraqi violation, U.S. 
punishment, lack of Iraqi retaliation, and return to U.S. 
readiness continued, but the tenor of the deterrence 
situation began to change.  Over time, the United States 
decided that the 1990s’ deterrence framework needed to 
evolve in response to a new U.S. geopolitical outlook.  The 
Bush administration perceived that the United States was 
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threatened by a WMD attack, delivered by uncertain state or 
non-state actors.  In the case of Iraq, the United States 
and the UN had constructed a “box” within which Iraqi 
behavior would be restrained after OPERATION DESERT STORM; 
activity within the box was acceptable to the United 
States, and activity outside the box was unacceptable to 
the United States.  For example, Iraqi activity in the no-
fly zones was outside the box; Iraqi harboring of the 
Mujahedin-e Khalq was within the box. 
B.  PARAMETERS OF THE NEW DETERRENCE SITUATION 
 Beginning in late 2001, the United States began 
redesigning a smaller box for Iraqi behavior.  This new box 
would be used as the measure by which the United States 
determined if Iraq was successfully deterred or if Iraq was 
due a punishment.  However, while the new U.S. concept of 
deterrence, itself, was not necessarily faulty, there were 
several problems with the conduct of deterrence on the part 
of the United States that suggest there was little chance 
for a strategy of deterrence to work against Iraq after 
September 2001.  First, the United States was slow in 
clearly communicating what behavior it expected Iraq to 
avoid, and the U.S. expectations evolved over the course of 
the 18 months between September 11, 2001 and the invasion 
of Iraq.  The United States did not communicate a specific 
threat to Iraq describing the consequences of failing to be 
deterred until a few months before the invasion.  U.S. 
resolve was difficult to ascertain due to more than a 
decade of hostile U.S. rhetoric and relatively modest U.S. 
action.  U.S. credibility was called into question because 
it displayed a necessity to work with the international 
community and because its policy toward North Korea’s 
nuclear program demonstrated a lack of consistency.  
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Finally, the United States gave no assurance that if Iraq’s 
behavior complied with the desires of the United States, it 
would not be attacked. 
 1.  Communication of the Deterrence Situation 
 Prior to September 2001, the United States publicly 
supported external Iraqi opposition movements, it publicly 
supported insurgent activity of Iraqi Kurds, it publicly 
mentioned the desirability of regime change in Iraq since 
at least 1998,80 and it regularly attacked Iraqi defenses 
that directly or indirectly endangered U.S. air operations 
over Iraq.  However, while it was clear to Iraq that the 
United States did not approve of Iraq’s government in 
general, the specific threats of U.S. military action and 
instances in which military action was delivered were 
limited to responses to Iraqi violations of a relatively 
clear cut set of guidelines, laid out in UNSCRs.  The 
question of Iraqi possession of WMD was not central to U.S. 
military activity in and around Iraq.  The UN weapons 
inspection team left Iraq in 1998, and the United States 
launched OPERATION DESERT FOX, seemingly as a punishment 
for Iraq violating its agreement to allow inspections under 
UNSRC 687.  However, after the U.S. attack, no further U.S. 
action was taken, yet Iraq did not revert back to its 
adherence of its agreement to allow inspections; Iraq 
stepped outside its box, and it failed to get back within 
its box after the U.S. punishment, yet the United States 
allowed this behavior.  From 1998 to 2001, the United 
States might have implemented a strategy of compellence to 
force Iraq to accept weapons inspections, but instead, Iraq 
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enjoyed a victory in sustaining a U.S. punishment but 
gaining freedom of action. 
 In the fall of 2001, the United States entered into a 
new deterrence situation with Iraq.  After sustaining the 
attacks of September 11, the Bush administration was struck 
by the realization of the possibility of a WMD attack on 
the United States.  The attitude of the Bush administration 
on the possession and acquisition of WMD by its foes and 
potential foes was clearly expressed in the NSS a year 
later, but in September 2001, the implied message to Iraq 
was, “do not use your WMD against the United States or its 
interests and do not proliferate your WMD to third 
parties.”  A problem with the deterrence situation during 
fall 2001 was that the United States left its description 
of unacceptable behavior open to inference by Iraq and that 
the United States did not communicate the consequences of 
an Iraqi decision to acquire more WMD or to share WMD with 
third parties (an actual Iraqi WMD attack would constitute 
an act of war, so no communication of consequences was 
necessary for that eventuality).  A lack of clear 
communication of U.S. demands required that Iraq determine 
what acceptable behavior was and what would be the likely 
U.S. response to unacceptable behavior. 
 The United States had perhaps disapproved of 
additional international parties acquiring WMD until 2001, 
but as argued in Chapter II, the stance adopted by the Bush 
administration of not allowing any anti-U.S. international 
actors to use WMD or acquire or attempt to acquire WMD or 
its precursor materials was clearly a change from previous 
U.S. policy.  A problem with the new Iraqi deterrence 
situation was that the U.S. “compellent” demand that Iraq 
allow weapons inspectors back into its territory was not 
  
 
 52  
accompanied by the communication that the United States had 
changed its stance on the possession of WMD or the 
communication that the United States was willing to invade 
Iraq if Iraq did not give the United States indisputable 
assurances that it did not possess WMD.  The United States 
redesigned Iraq’s box such that Iraq would not only be 
prevented from possessing any WMD, but also that it must 
disprove U.S. intelligence reports that concluded that Iraq 
had WMD; due to the heavy reliance on intelligence in the 
new deterrence situation, Iraq was presumed guilty until it 
proved itself innocent.  But, based on the previous, known 
U.S. complicity with Iraqi possession of WMD, Iraq had no 
reason to conclude that its failure to disprove U.S. 
intelligence could lead to war. 
 By way of contrast to the lack of clear U.S. 
communication of its stance on Iraqi WMD, on October 9, 
2001, U.S. Ambassador to the UN, John Negroponte, informed 
his Iraqi counterpart that Iraq would be attacked and 
defeated if it tried to take advantage of U.S. distraction 
with the war in Afghanistan and conduct military action 
against its neighbors.81  Since the United States was not so 
clear about its expectations and consequences for Iraq 
concerning WMD, one of the first post-September 11 
inferences on U.S. intent for Iraq came from Iraqi Deputy 
Prime Minister Tariq ‘Aziz who stated on October 28, 2001 
that he was aware that it was only a matter of time before 
Iraq was attacked by the United States as part of the war 
on terrorism.82  Similar statements from ‘Aziz and Saddam 
Hussein, particularly concerning the readiness of the Iraqi 
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people to repel the American invaders, can be found in 
press releases from throughout the winter, spring and 
summer of 2002; these statements show that in the absence 
of clear communication from Washington, Baghdad expected 
the worst possible punishment, but for an unspecified 
behavior.  The threat of invasion and regime change might 
have seemed to Iraq too drastic an endeavor for the United 
States, particularly considering that U.S. rhetoric in 2001 
and 2002 sounded very similar to U.S. rhetoric during 1991-
2001; the lack of clear communication about the shift in 
the U.S. perception of the WMD threat perhaps made the non-
specific U.S. addresses after September 2001 unworthy of 
serious consideration by Iraq. 
 The following sample of the U.S. presentation of the 
new deterrence situation shows its ambiguity. 
• President Bush on November 26, 2001 urged Iraq to 
allow UN weapons inspections in order to prove that 
Iraq had no WMD, and he suggested that Iraq might be 
the next target of the war on terrorism;83 however, 
the link between weapons inspections and war was not 
clearly delivered. 
• In his State of the Union Address of January 29, 
2002, President Bush referenced Iraq and WMD and 
stated, “America will do what is necessary to ensure 
our nation's security…The United States of America 
will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes 
to threaten us with the world's most destructive 
weapons.”84  Again, the United States expressed 
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concern over WMD, but it still had not clearly 
communicated the new deterrence situation. 
• Similarly, on March 13, 2002, President Bush left 
the consequences of Iraqi defiance vague with his 
statement that “all options are on the table,” and 
the requirement for Iraq to disclose its weapons 
information and allow inspectors into Iraq was left 
suggestive rather than imperative: “one thing I will 
not allow is a nation such as Iraq to threaten our 
very future by developing weapons of mass 
destruction.  They've agreed not to have those 
weapons; they ought to conform to their agreement, 
comply with their agreement.”85 
The United States expended most of its efforts during first 
half of 2002 in making an argument to numerous states that 
Iraq posed a serious threat to the international community 
and that its violations of UNSCRs warranted a strong 
international response.  The Bush administration repeatedly 
stated that it would consult with other states prior to 
taking any military action against Iraq, but it never 
presented the specific case(s) in which the United States 
would find it necessary to act. 
 It was not until President Bush’s September 12, 2002 
address to the UN General Assembly that the United States 
finally stated its specific demands of Iraq, which 
basically constituted a formal demand that Iraq comply with 
all provisions of UNSCRs 686, 687 and 688. 
If all these steps are taken, it will signal a 
new openness and accountability in Iraq.  And it 
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could open the prospect of the United Nations 
helping to build a government that represents all 
Iraqis -- a government based on respect for human 
rights, economic liberty, and internationally 
supervised elections…the purposes of the United 
States should not be doubted.  The Security 
Council resolutions will be enforced -- the just 
demands of peace and security will be met -- or 
action will be unavoidable.  And a regime that 
has lost its legitimacy will also lose its 
power.86 
The situation was framed as Iraq must comply with all 
applicable UNSCRs or the United States will enforce the 
UNSCRs with the result of regime change in Baghdad.  
However, almost as soon as the United States clearly stated 
its desired Iraqi behavior and its threat of punishment in 
the case of non-compliance, the United States began to 
change the parameters of the situation.  Even before 
President Bush’s address to the UN General Assembly, the 
Bush administration had indicated that a return to an 
inspections regime was unacceptable; on August 26, 2002 
Vice President Cheney commented on the futility of 
inspections in Iraq: 
Saddam has perfected the game of cheat and 
retreat, and is very skilled in the art of denial 
and deception.  A return of inspectors would 
provide no assurance whatsoever of his compliance 
with UN resolutions.  On the contrary, there is a 
great danger that it would provide false comfort  
that Saddam was somehow "back in his box."87 
Similarly, President Bush stated on September 14, 2002, 
“Congress must make it unmistakably clear that when it 
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comes to confronting the growing danger posed by Iraq's 
efforts to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction, 
the status quo is totally unacceptable.”88  President Bush 
clarified his intent on September 23, 2002 when he 
explained that he wanted a UNSCR “which will allow freedom-
loving countries to disarm Saddam Hussein before he 
threatens his neighborhood, before he threatens freedom, 
before he threatens America and before he threatens 
civilization.”89  By October 2, 2002, the demand on Iraq 
became clear: “Saddam must disarm, period.  If, however, he 
chooses to do otherwise, if he persists in his defiance, 
the use of force may become unavoidable.”90 
 It had taken roughly one year for U.S. communications 
to proceed from an implication that “Iraq must not use WMD 
against the United States” (deterrence) to a demand that 
“Iraq must prove that it does not have WMD” (compellence in 
support of deterrence) to the imperative that “Iraq must 
disarm” (compellence).  Before the beginning of OPERATION 
IRAQI FREEDOM almost six months later, the U.S. stance had 
evolved even further from a demand that Iraq could 
understand and comply with regarding weapons to the final 
U.S. demand that Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave 
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Iraq within 48 hours if war was to be avoided.91  Between 
September 11, 2001 and March 20, 2003, the United States 
was very slow in communicating its demands to Iraq, and 
after communications became clear in September 2002, Iraq’s 
box of acceptable behavior became smaller and smaller until 
Saddam Hussein’s only chance to avoid war was his 
abdication. 
 2.  Communication of the Threat 
 The communication of the results of an Iraqi failure 
to comply with U.S. demands was similarly slow in gelling 
to clarity, but once the threat was finally made clear, the 
only problem with the communication of the threat remained 
the timetable for Iraqi compliance.  Unlike the above cited 
statement of Ambassador Negroponte regarding the U.S. 
threat to attack and defeat Iraq if it attacked its 
neighbors, the United States not only failed to clearly and 
consistently threaten invasion and regime change as a 
result of Iraq’s failure to comply with U.S. demands, but 
its method of pushing the requirement for Iraqi compliance 
further and further into the future served to assure Iraq 
that war was neither being planned (initially) nor would 
result from noncompliance. 
 President Bush first vaguely expressed in January 2002 
that the United States would “do what is necessary” to 
protect itself from an Iraqi threat.92  Then he showed the 
indecision of the United States in how it would respond to 
Iraq defiance in March 2002 by stating that “all options 
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are on the table.”93  He then proceeded to repeatedly state 
that the United States would consult with other countries 
before taking any action.  Before the UN General Assembly 
in September 2002, he offered the more menacing threat that 
“action will be unavoidable” if Iraq does not abide by 
UNSCRs.94  But then 20 days later, he reduced the connection 
between Iraqi noncompliance and U.S. action by stating that 
“if [Saddam Hussein] persists in his defiance, the use of 
force may become unavoidable” (emphasis added).95  As 
President Bush signed the U.S. Congress resolution granting 
him the authority to use force against Iraq on October 16, 
2002, he again clarified the threat of use of force with, 
“Either the Iraqi regime will give up its weapons of mass 
destruction, or, for the sake of peace, the United States 
will lead a global coalition to disarm that regime.”96  
After October 16, the United States remained consistent in 
communicating its threat of war as a result of the failure 
of Iraq to disarm, giving Iraq five months during which 
clear U.S. communications existed prior to war. 
 Not only was the United States slow in seriously 
threatening Iraq with invasion, but also it denied 
suggestions (which could have served to lend credibility to 
its deterrent, then “compellent,” threat of military 
action) that it was preparing for war.  In November 2001, 
Secretary of State Colin Powell denied speculations that 
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the United States was preparing for an attack on Iraq.97  
Even after President Bush’s address to the UN General 
Assembly, Secretary Rumsfeld denied that the U.S. and 
British destruction of Iraqi air defense systems beginning 
on September 16, 2002 constituted a preparation for war.98  
Similarly, Secretary Powell, rather than emphasizing the 
U.S. readiness to strike Iraq, stated that the military 
buildup in the Persian Gulf at the end of December 2002 did 
not make war inevitable.99 
 The aversion of the Bush administration for declaring 
that formal war preparations were underway may have harmed 
the chances for obtaining Iraqi compliance.  Similarly, the 
Bush administration’s failure to specify a definitive 
deadline for compliance soon after communications were 
clarified also may have reduced the chances for obtaining 
Iraqi compliance.  After declaring in September 2002 that a 
failure to disarm would result in war, the United States 
delayed action by seeking a UNSCR to support military 
action against Iraq.  The desired resolution of November 8, 
2002, UNSCR 1441, demanded that Iraq provide immediate, 
unimpeded unrestricted access for weapons inspections or 
face serious consequences, but upon Iraq’s presenting an 
incomplete or erroneous weapons declaration to the UN and 
its resisting the efforts of the UN weapons inspection 
team, the United States simply restated its objections, 
restated its demands, and restated it threat.  The United 
States began staging forces for war, but it was not clear 
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when Iraq’s last chance to comply would be.  On January 14, 
2003 President Bush said, “Time is running out on Saddam 
Hussein.  He must disarm.  I'm sick and tired of games and 
deception.  And that's my view of timetables.”100  After 
numerous other statements from the Bush administration that 
indicated that time was running out for Saddam Hussein, 
President Bush seemingly leaned forward toward war on 
February 6, 2003, the day after Secretary Powell addressed 
the UN Security Council with his evidence of Iraq’s UNSCR 
violations and general threat to the world: “Saddam Hussein 
will be stopped.”101 
 While the tenor of U.S. messages during the five 
months leading up to OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM was indicative 
of U.S. intentions and the U.S. message was finally made 
relatively clear and consistent, the forum for the 
deterrence/compellence situation was one of delay.  The 
“compellent” demands of the United States were left open-
ended while the United States sought the support of the 
international community for military action through 
diplomacy in the UN, with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, and with individual states.  Other than the 
deployment of military force to the region, Iraq was given 
little indication that its situation became graver between 
October 2002 and February 2003; U.S. reiterations that time 
was running out and Iraq must disarm did not have the same 
finality as a deadline for compliance might have. 
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 3.  Resolve and Credibility 
 Although the Bush administration took 18 months to 
complete its move toward war with Iraq, its rhetoric 
indicated that it intended to remove the threat of Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq through peaceful or violent means.  However, 
its resolve in remaining dedicated to the confrontation and 
its credibility in delivering the threats it promised were 
reduced by 11 years of hostile U.S. rhetoric and relatively 
little U.S. action.  The relationship that the United 
States had built with Iraq since the end of OPERATION 
DESERT STORM was one in which Iraq was contained, but it 
was not required to comply with all U.S. demands.  The 
United States routinely inflicted punishment on Iraq for 
violations, but there were no serious consequences for 
Iraq; Iraq absorbed air attacks on its defense 
infrastructure and may have even grown numb to frequent 
U.S. punishments, and economic sanctions on Iraq evidently 
did not cause pain for Iraq’s leaders or jeopardize their 
hold on power.  In order to be successful, the Bush 
administration had to make it clear to Iraq’s leadership 
that the situation had changed and that the United States 
expected full compliance or it would unseat the government 
through war.  Even considering that U.S. communications 
with Iraq were less than ideal during the 18 months prior 
to war, Iraq failed to recognize some indicators that U.S. 
threats were credible and U.S. resolve was steady and 
consistent.  Although the United States was not successful 
in peacefully settling the conflict with Iraq, its behavior 
during the confrontation might lend credibility to future 
deterrence situations. 
 The U.S. decision to work within international forums 
proved to be a double-edged sword.  The failure of the UN 
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to enforce its UNSCRs since the end of the 1991 Gulf War 
made it questionable whether it was an appropriate forum to 
exert pressure on Iraq in 2002 and 2003.  Iraq had every 
reason to believe that lack of international consensus and 
resolve would result in more inaction toward its defiance 
of UNSCRs.  Additionally, the opposition of traditional 
U.S. partners and allies, such as France and Germany, to 
the U.S. bias for action against Iraq in the UN gave weight 
to an Iraqi belief that while trying to obtain the consent 
of the UN, the United States would not succeed in gathering 
approval for military action.  Although the Bush 
administration repeatedly declared that it would consult 
with other states prior to acting in Iraq but it would not 
be restrained by lack of consensus, the United States 
continued to exert a lot of effort in the UN through 
February 2003; it might have been difficult for Iraq to 
believe that the United States would act in defiance of UN 
consensus while the United States continued to seemingly 
restrain itself with the UN until the final weeks of the 
confrontation. 
 However, the Bush administration’s much publicized 
activity within the international arena also should have 
lent credibility to U.S. demands and threats.  By 
repeatedly stating its demands and threats and repeatedly 
stating that the United States would act alone if necessary 
in international forums, the Bush administration was making 
the costs of not fulfilling its promises very high; in the 
absence of eventual U.S. action, all states would witness 
that the U.S. threats of punishment were empty promises. 
  The threat of war by the United States, a democracy, 
inherently lacked some credibility because war is extremely 
costly in lives of represented citizens and state resources 
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and it could be costly politically for the Bush 
administration.  The United States developed a bad 
reputation for staying power in the face of war casualties 
during the previous two decades.  Additionally, U.S. 
military operations in Afghanistan made it questionable if 
the United States would be willing to undertake another 
major military operation simultaneously.  However, as in 
the case of the international arena, the Bush 
administration’s statements to its domestic audience might 
have made it too costly for it to not act; after stating 
that Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to stay in power, it 
would have been politically costly if he was still in power 
and defiant during the 2004 election.  Furthermore, 
President Bush’s acquisition of a Congress resolution to 
use force against Iraq if necessary should have 
demonstrated to the Iraqi leadership that President Bush 
had domestic support for action. 
 Finally, simultaneous U.S. policy in cases apart from 
Iraq was also both detrimental and beneficial to U.S. 
credibility.  The U.S. policy toward North Korea’s nuclear 
program showed that not all states in possession of WMD 
would be treated identically by the United States, making 
the U.S. stance toward Iraq less credible; it was 
questionable whether or not the United States would go to 
war over WMD in Iraq while not even considering war over 
WMD in North Korea.  Iraq noted this discrepancy in U.S. 
policy on December 31, 2002.102  Conversely, U.S. action in 
Afghanistan in 2001 served as a demonstration that the 
United States was willing to take decisive military action 
against foes it considered to threaten the security of the 
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United States.  However, as early as December 2001, 
Secretary Powell indicated that success in Afghanistan 
should not suggest success in Iraq since the situations 
were different and Iraq’s military was far superior to that 
of the Taliban.103 
 4.  Assurances 
 The United States never gave Iraq assurances that if 
it complied with all U.S. demands then it would not be 
attacked.  The United States attempted to gain support for 
military action against Iraq throughout the first half of 
2002, months before it ever clearly communicated its 
demands and threats to Iraq; the United States contemplated 
military action against Iraq before the United States 
suggested to Iraq that punishment would come if Iraq 
refused to comply with renewed demands for admittance of UN 
weapons inspectors.  By seeking international support for 
military action before insisting that Iraq comply with 
UNSCRs, the United States showed that it expected that its 
demands were not going to be met.  When Tariq ‘Aziz 
suggested in October 2001 that it was only a matter of time 
until the United States attacked Iraq as part of its war on 
terrorism, the United States did not dispel his fears; 
rather, the Bush administration stated that war with Iraq 
was not imminent in 2001.104 
 Similarly, after initial, but vague, communications of 
the new deterrence situation to Iraq during spring 2002, 
the Bush administration indicated that even if Iraq 
accepted weapons inspectors back into its territory, the 
Iraqi WMD threat would still remain due to Iraqi deception.  
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If the WMD threat was what the United States would not 
tolerate, then Iraqi compliance with U.S. demands for 
weapons inspections would not serve to remove U.S. 
insecurity; although the United States threatened 
punishment only if Iraq did not disarm, it was clear that 
the United States maintained that Iraq could not be 
compelled to disarm simply with the re-admittance of 
weapons inspectors.  Therefore, the U.S. demand for renewed 
inspections was meaningless for Iraq.  Iraq had no 
incentive to comply with U.S. demands because the situation 
was framed such that there was no way to avoid  U.S. 
punishment: the United States told Iraq that it must 
disarm; the United States insisted that disarmament could 
only be conducted with Iraq’s full cooperation with weapons 
inspectors; however, the United States maintained that 
weapons inspectors could not ensure disarmament because 
Iraq was always suspected of deception and obstruction; 
therefore, the United States offered no way for Iraq to 
prove that it had disarmed.  If U.S. punishment would be 
contingent on proving whether or not Iraq had disarmed, 
then Iraq had no reason to cooperate with weapons 
inspectors because in the eyes of the United States, it 
would be unable to prove it had no WMD with or without the 
presence of inspectors.  Iraq had reason to believe that if 
the U.S. threat proved credible, the punishment would come 
in a matter of time, regardless of Iraqi responses to U.S. 
demands. 
 While Iraqi activity was arguably obstructionist on 
the matter of WMD throughout the 18 months of 
confrontation, it should be noted that it offered some 
overtures and made some concessions in hope of avoiding 
war.  For example, on March 25, 2002, Baghdad announced it 
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was ready to receive a U. S team (with conditions) to 
investigate the fate of an American pilot shot down during 
OPERATION DESERT STORM as a gesture of goodwill;105 
similarly, on December 8, 2002, Saddam Hussein apologized 
to the Kuwaiti people for Iraq’s 1990 invasion.106  In terms 
of Iraqi concessions directly related to WMD, Iraq allowed 
a limited, four-day inspection of a former research center 
near Baghdad by the International Atomic Energy Agency in 
January 2002;107 on September 16, 2002, Iraq announced that 
it would unconditionally allow the return of weapons 
inspectors (although it then proceeded to argue for 
conditions);108 on October 1 Iraq agreed to drop almost all 
restrictions on inspections, except for the inspection of 
eight presidential palaces,109 but after the arrival of the 
inspection team on November 26, the inspectors were granted 
access to palaces on December 3;110 Iraq delivered a weapons 
disclosure report, as required by the UN (but it was widely 
believed to be incomplete and misleading);111 on December 22 
Iraqi General ‘Amir Sa’adi invited Central Intelligence 
Agency agents to accompany UN weapons inspectors;112 on 
December 27 and 28 Iraq provided a list of scientists, who 
had once worked on banned weapons programs, to the 
inspection team (but the list was believed to be 
incomplete), and Iraq agreed to allow interviews of these 
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scientists outside of Iraq (but it was believed that the 
scientists were coerced into not cooperating);113 Iraq 
finally agreed to allow one scientist to be interviewed 
without a government witness on February 6, 2003 (but 
again, coercion was suspected);114 on February 14 Saddam 
Hussein issued a decree banning the construction or 
importation of WMD (although it was not accepted as 
sincere), and Iraq allowed for surveillance flights in 
conjunction with inspections;115 and on March 2, Iraq 
destroyed its banned al-Samoud 2 missiles, in accordance 
with a UN deadline.116  However, for each concession made by 
Iraq, the U.S. response was that the Iraqi concession was 
not sincere and did not constitute full compliance with 
UNSCRs (and Iraq repeatedly rejected demands for renewed 
weapons inspections until fall 2002 and Iraq made war 
preparations throughout the 18 months of confrontation).  
The Bush administration also indicated that the Iraqi 
concessions were simply aimed at buying more time.  Rather 
than taking a step-by-step diplomatic approach with Iraq, 
the United States threats were based on an all-or-nothing 
demand.  In view of U.S. dissatisfaction with each Iraqi 
concession, Iraq might have concluded that the United 
States would eventually attack, regardless of how 
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CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
A.  DETERRENCE AS A VIABLE STRATEGY 
 The Bush administration’s outlook on the security 
challenges facing the United States is influenced by the 
attacks of September 11.  In light of the reality that 
enemies of the United States can catastrophically strike at 
U.S. interests despite U.S. military might, forward 
presence and global reach, despite U.S. economic strength, 
despite U.S. information superiority, and despite U.S. 
diplomatic influence and power, the Bush administration 
reassessed its security strategy; the Bush administration 
is determined that further attacks on the magnitude of 
those of September 11 will not be allowed to succeed.  The 
danger of WMD use by U.S. adversaries especially captures 
the attention of President Bush. 
 Although the Bush administration does not totally 
abandon the use of deterrence as a national strategy, 
deterrence, when conceived of as promised retaliation in 
response to an opponent’s attack, is not an acceptable 
option for those states and non-state actors which might 
use WMD against the United States.  Traditional concepts of 
deterrence make the assumption that no action will be taken 
on the part of the United States if its opponent does not 
first attack the United States.  In the past, the 
likelihood that an enemy of the United States, other than 
the Soviet Union, could successfully carry out an attack on 
the United States was minimal, the threat of U.S. 
retaliation was terrifying, and the international actors 
that needed to be deterred consisted only of nation-states; 
although the Soviet Union had the ability to attack the 
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United States with nuclear weapons, it might be argued that 
the concept of MAD made the results of a deterrence failure 
so horrific that deterrence failures were seldom seriously 
considered.  Today, the unwillingness of the Bush 
administration to endure attacks of any kind on the United 
States requires either that deterrence be abandoned as a 
strategy (because it cannot guarantee that all attacks will 
be prevented) or that a new concept of deterrence be 
adopted.117  A new concept of deterrence is compatible with 
the Bush administration’s bias for action in the face of 
threats that are not yet completely formed (such as the 
fledgling WMD programs of potential U.S. enemies), and it 
is useful in filling the U.S. gap between threat 
recognition and preemptive or preventive attacks.118  
 While they appear to be radically offensive departures 
from previous national security ideas, the concepts of 
preventive war and preemption are not stand-alone concepts 
in the realm of national security; these concepts (and the 
Bush administration’s apparent willingness to employ them) 
should be considered two of many threats available for the 
United States to offer to its opponents while pursuing a 
strategy of deterrence.  Just as in traditional concepts of 
deterrence in which the United States would attack its 
opponent only after it was first attacked, in a new concept 
of deterrence, preemption and preventive war would occur 
only in cases of deterrence failures. 
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 A useful concept of deterrence for today’s security 
environment is one in which the United States, as in the 
case of traditional concepts of deterrence, still presents 
to an opponent a situation in which the United States 
threatens a particular action only as a result of a 
particular behavior on the part of its opponent: “if you do 
A, the United States will do B.”  However, while 
traditional concepts of deterrence would suggest that A 
equates to some form of attack on the United States and B 
equates to retaliation of some sort, a new concept of 
deterrence offers the flexibility to define A as some 
activity short of an attack (such as the attempted 
acquisition of WMD) and B, therefore, as a preemptive, 
rather than retaliatory, attack.  In addition to deterrence 
by punishment, the United States should also maintain the 
concepts of deterrence by denial and positive deterrence in 
its “deterrence toolbox.”119 
 The basic dynamics of the relationship between 
opponents in the new concept of deterrence remain the same 
as those in traditional concepts of deterrence.  No concept 
of deterrence is foolproof and there are many potential 
pitfalls to avoid if deterrence is to succeed.  Similarly, 
there are several key elements to observe in pursuit of 
successful deterrence, such as clear and timely U.S. 
communication of the activity to be avoided and the 
threatened punishment, demonstration of U.S. resolve and 
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credibility, and assurances that punishment will be 
withheld if the opponent chooses to be deterred. 
B.  COMMUNICATING DETERRENCE PARAMETERS VERSUS WAR 
 MONGERING 
 Clear communication between opponents is essential in 
any concept of deterrence.  In today’s security environment 
of uncertain but substantial threats being developed in 
secret, the Bush administration is faced with the prospect 
of necessarily appearing overbearing and aggressive within 
the international community if the new concept of 
deterrence is to be successful.  The Bush administration 
must clearly threaten punishment specifically to those 
international actors which it fears may develop the 
capability to harm the United States with WMD, for example.  
In issuing these threats, the United States might be viewed 
as war mongering by its friends and allies (as well as by 
ambivalent actors and foes); the United States could lose 
the support of traditionally sympathetic states, and the 
result among its foes might be the development of 
escalation through spiral dynamics.  However, the United 
States cannot expect to avoid the necessity of preemptive 
attacks or preventive war if its foes are not made to 
clearly understand that their development of a threatening 
capacity toward the United States and its interests will 
result in punishment by the United States, even in the 
absence of hostile action.  In order to minimize opposition 
to U.S. deterrence efforts, U.S. diplomatic efforts must 
work to convince the international community that the 
security challenges it seeks to deter are significant and 
credible through some intelligence sharing.  It must also 
provide assurances, both for the incentive of the opponent 
and for the reduction of an aggressive U.S. image in the 
  
 
 73  
international eye, that in the absence of threat 
development, the United States does not intend to strike.  
The Iraq case shows the importance of clear communication 
of the parameters of the deterrence situation not only for 
the opponent, but also for U.S. reputation.  The U.S. 
reputation for assurances and predictable behavior might 
have been damaged through the Iraq case because the United 
States for many months indicated that its requirement was 
disarmament through renewed weapons inspections; by 
attacking despite the renewal of weapons inspections, the 
United States gives the appearance that it will not observe 
its part of the deterrence bargain that the United States 
will only do B if the opponent does A.  In the future, the 
United States must ensure that its clear communication of 
the deterrence parameters leave all parties (opponents and 
observers) with no doubts that the United States intends to 
act exactly and only as it threatens. 
C.  THE INTELLIGENCE DILEMMA 
 While in traditional concepts of deterrence accurate 
intelligence is required in order to determine the 
opponent’s intent, capability and vulnerabilities, the new 
concept of deterrence necessarily relies even more on 
accurate intelligence because the United States proposes to 
act militarily in some cases in which no overtly hostile 
action had been demonstrated on the part of its opponent.  
In the case of the U.S. concern about WMD threats, the 
United States might demand that its foes do not possess, 
use, distribute or attempt to acquire WMD or WMD precursor 
material under threat of U.S. military action.  U.S. 
intelligence efforts are instrumental in monitoring the 
deterrence situation and in determining when U.S. action is 
appropriate; the United States refuses to absorb an attack 
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before acting, so intelligence must show when an enemy 
attack is possible or imminent.  Intelligence is never 
complete or completely accurate, so there is always the 
possibility that the U.S. estimate of its opponent’s WMD 
threat is overstated.  Therefore, as in the case of Iraq, 
if an opponent is to avoid a U.S. attack as a result of the 
U.S. perception that the opponent chose not to be deterred 
(it acquired WMD), then the opponent must disprove the 
suspected activity estimated by U.S. intelligence.  As a 
result, if the United States hopes to avoid war, its 
deterrence situation must evolve into a compellence 
situation, in which the opponent is forced to provide 
evidence that it has not violated the U.S. demand that it 
not acquire WMD. 
 In the case of Iraq, the compellence situation was 
grounded in UNSCRs, so the United States had justification 
to demand that Iraq prove it had no banned weapons.  
However, if the United States is to use this same demand 
against other would-be WMD armed opponents, the compellence 
situation becomes problematic.  If there is no regime for 
WMD monitoring of an opponent, extracting proof from the 
opponent that it does not have WMD may involve a violation 
of or an affront to its sovereignty.  If the opponent 
refuses to allow for the intrusive, “compellent” demand 
that it provides proof of its lack of WMD, then the United 
States is forced to make a decision on whether or not to 
punish the opponent based on its own intelligence.  
Unfortunately, the current lack of significant indications 
of WMD presence in Iraq makes the prospect of doling out 
punishments based on suspicion of obtaining WMD risky for 
the United States.  The United States will have to be 
concerned of lack of popular support for military action 
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based on possibly flawed or “hyped” intelligence in both 
international and domestic audiences.  Similarly, the 
example of the Iraq invasion might show opponents that 
compliance with U.S. demands for proof of their lack of WMD 
will not be convincing enough for the United States to 
decide against military action anyway. 
 The United States can employ a new concept of 
deterrence to meet the threats of the current security 
environment, but it must be willing to be as aggressive in 
its language to and treatment of its potential foes as the 
NSS implies the United States will be when faced with a 
threat from WMD.  Additionally, while all situations within 
the international security environment must be addressed 
individually,120 in those cases in which the United States 
decides to employ a strategy of deterrence, it is vital to 
U.S. credibility that the United States acts in the case of 











                         
120
 For example, the case of North Korea’s suspected acquisition of 
nuclear weapons presented a much different case than Iraq’s suspected 
maintenance of WMD; there is no standard solution to all WMD-related 
security challenges.  So, in the interest of maintaining its 
credibility and resolve, it is best that the United States not attempt 
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